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Abstract
This paper examines stock liquidity in explaining the mixed relations between finan-
cial constraints and stock returns and the pricing of stock liquidity across financially
constrained and unconstrained firms. We find a negative relation in liquid portfolios
and a positive relation in illiquid portfolios. Financially constrained firms have higher
liquidity risk and earn a higher illiquidity premium than unconstrained firms. Financial
constraints cannot be independently priced in stock returns and can only be priced in
conjunction with stock liquidity in bad economic times. Stock liquidity is independently
priced for financially constrained firms or in good times, but not for unconstrained firms.
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1 Introduction
Modern finance theory suggests that investors demand higher returns for holding stocks
with higher risk. Consistent with this view, Gomes et al. (2006), Whited and Wu (2006), and
Livdan et al. (2009) find that financially constrained firms are riskier and generate higher
returns than unconstrained firms. Conversely, Lamont et al. (2001) report that financially
constrained firms earn lower returns than unconstrained firms and this relation cannot be
explained by monetary policy and credit conditions. Campello and Chen (2010) attribute the
mixed relations between financial constraints and stock returns to macroeconomic conditions,
while Li (2011) finds that the financial constraints-return relation is strengthened by the firm’s
research and development (R&D) intensity. However, there is no consensus on the explanation
for the mixed relations in the literature. On the other hand, although the pricing of stock
liquidity has been extensively studied,1 there is surprisingly little empirical research on how
the pricing of stock liquidity is affected by financial constraints. Our work addresses the
research gap in the literature.
In this study, we examine whether the mixed relations between financial constraints and
stock returns are associated with stock liquidity and the pricing of stock liquidity across
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Financial constraints and stock liquidity are
likely to be highly correlated with each other. Intuitively, financially constrained firms tend to
be small and illiquid firms, while unconstrained firms are typically large and liquid firms. As a
result, financially constrained firms are likely to have higher liquidity risk than unconstrained
1See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996), Amihud (2002), Easley et
al. (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Liu (2006), and Sadka (2006).
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firms, and illiquid firms are expected to have more financial constraints than liquid firms.
We, therefore, conjecture that financially constrained firms should earn a higher illiquidity
premium than unconstrained firms and that the financial constraint premiums could differ
between liquid and illiquid firms. Moreover, we expect that there is an interaction effect
between financial constraints and stock liquidity on stock returns and that the effect varies
over the business cycle.
Our hypotheses are motivated by three strands of the literature. First, both financial
constraints and stock liquidity are highly related to asymmetric information. Financial con-
straints are associated with a firm’s supply of capital2 and the opportunity cost of internal
capital and its external cost of capital (Fazzari et al., 1988). Greenwald et al. (1984) and My-
ers and Majluf (1984) document that asymmetric information can increase the cost of raising
external equity since potential buyers with limited information are unwilling to pay higher
prices. Morellec and Schürhoff (2011) demonstrate that financially constrained firms have a
higher degree of asymmetric information than unconstrained firms. Moreover, a substantial
body of literature finds that asymmetric information reduces stock liquidity due to higher
adverse selection costs and lower trading volume.3 Therefore, financial constraints are likely
to be correlated with stock liquidity due to asymmetric information.
Second, the existing literature shows that stock liquidity has strong links with the proxies
of financial constraints. For instance, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) show
2See, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) Almeida and Campello (2004), and Whited and Wu (2006)
3See, for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Admati and Pfeiderer
(1988), Glosten and Harris (1988), Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1995), Easley et al. (1996), and Kelly and Ljungqvist
(2012).
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that stock liquidity is positively related to firm size. Banerjee et al. (2007) find that stock
liquidity influences a firm’s dividend policy. Odders-White and Ready (2006) and Gopalan
et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms with good credit ratings are likely to be liquid firms.
Bulter et al. (2005) report that stock market liquidity plays an important role in determining
the cost of raising external capital. Mazouz et al. (2014) also show that the cost of equity
capital is associated with systematic liquidity risk. Since both financial constraints and stock
liquidity have the impacts on stock returns, they are likely to have an interaction effect on
stock returns.
Third, from an economic stance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) theoretically show that credit
constraints amplify business cycle fluctuations and impact asset prices. Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994), Kashyap et al. (1994), Campello and Chen (2010), and Campello et al. (2010) doc-
ument that financially constrained firms bind more during recessions than during expansions
because of a deterioration in credit, which leads to differences in stock returns across finan-
cially constrained and unconstrained firms over the business cycle. Change et al. (2019) also
find macroeconomic conditions have an impact on financial constraints and firms’ financing
decisions. Moreover, Næs et al. (2011) show that aggregate stock liquidity is a good indica-
tor of the real economy and changes with the business cycle. As both financial constraints
and stock liquidity are affected by business conditions, we expect that the interaction effect
between financial constraints and stock liquidity on stock returns changes with the business
cycle.
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There has been considerable debate in the literature regarding the best measure of financial
constraints.4 In this study, we follow Dasgupta et al. (2019) and employ four firm character-
istic measures of asset size, dividend payout, bond rating, and commercial paper rating, and
two index measures of the WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006) and HP index (Hadlock and
Pierce, 2010) as proxies for financial constraints. The firm characteristic measures capture
the individual dimension of financial constraints in a firm’s vulnerability to capital market
imperfection, funding situation, and accessibility to the public debt markets. The WW and
HP indices capture different dimensions of financial constraints and avoid the problems of
sample selection, simultaneity, and measurement-error (Whited and Wu, 2006; Hadlock and
Pierce, 2010). Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) report that based on the individual firm
characteristic, WW, and HP indices measures, financially constrained firms show strong com-
monalities. We exclude the commonly used KZ index measure (Kaplan and Zingales,1997)
because the measure is difficult to capture the variation of financial constraints across firms
and over time, and is subject to have measurement errors (Whited and Wu, 2006; Farre-Mensa
and Ljungqvist, 2016). We compute three stock illiquidity measures; these are the bid-ask
spread of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the price impact measure of Amihud (2002), and
the turnover of Datar et al. (1998). Then, following Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), we estimate
the first principal component of three individual stock liquidity measures to capture multiple
dimensions of stock liquidity.
4See for example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Whited and Wu (2006), Hadlock and Pierce (2010), Bodnaruk et
al. (2015), Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016), and Schauer et al. (2019).
4
We find that financially constrained firms have higher liquidity risk and earn higher illiq-
uidity premiums than unconstrained firms. Furthermore, the financial constraint premiums
are significantly negative for liquid portfolios and are positive for illiquid portfolios. Consis-
tent with our hypothesis, there is a strong interaction effect between financial constraints and
stock liquidity on stock returns. With only a few exceptions, the interaction effect is strong
in bad economic times and weak in good economic times. We also find that stock liquidity is
independently priced in the cross-section of stock returns for financially constrained firms or
in good times, but it is not independently priced for financially unconstrained firms.
The effects of financial constraints on firm behavior are important issues in corporate
finance. A number of studies have demonstrated that financial constraints have a strong
impact on firms’ investment behavior (Fazzari et al.,1988; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995;
Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Campello et al., 2010); cash holdings (Denis and Sibikov, 2010);
R&D investment (Li, 2011); stock repurchase decisions (Chen and Wang, 2012); cash tax
savings and income shifting (Dyreng and Markle, 2016; Edwards et al., 2016); merger and
acquisition activities (Greene, 2017); accounting information quality (Kurt, 2018); inventory
behavior (Dasgupta et al., 2019); and firm productivity (Jin et al., 2019). Moreover, Haider
et al. (2018) demonstrate that financial constraints are affected by government ownership and
also influence firms’ performance. Therefore, a better understanding of the interaction effect
between financial constraints and stock liquidity is important not only for investors but also
for decision-makers within corporations.
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This paper differs from prior studies in financial constraints and stock liquidity in two as-
pects. First, the existing financial constraints literature mainly examines the relation between
financial constraints and stock returns of all stocks.5 Little empirical research has addressed
the impact of stock liquidity on this relation. Our study adds to the literature by exploring
a novel interaction effect between financial constraints and stock liquidity on stock returns.
We shed light on the mixed relations between financial constraints and stock returns in the
literature that are associated with stock liquidity. Our findings have an important implication
for investors in that the premium earned from financially constrained firms is compensation
for taking on higher liquidity risk rather than the risk of financial constraints.
Second, numerous studies have reported that stock liquidity is systematically priced in the
cross-section of stock returns.6 However, whether the pricing of stock liquidity varies with
financial constraints and macroeconomic conditions has not been comprehensively explored.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the pricing separately for financially constrained
and unconstrained firms, and under different macroeconomic conditions. Our findings provide
new insight into asset pricing that the pricing of stock liquidity is dominated by financially
constrained firms or good economic conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
link between financial constraints, stock liquidity, liquidity risk, and stock returns. Section 3
describes the data, the proxies for financial constraints, and the measures of liquidity. Section
4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
5See for example, Lamont et al. (2001), Gomes et al. (2006), Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan et al. (2009).
6See footnote 1.
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2 The links between financial constraints, stock liquid-
ity, liquidity risk, and stock returns
In this section, we begin with the discussion on the connection between financial constraints
and stock liquidity through asymmetric information. We further explore the relation between
financial constraints and expected stock returns on an investment-based asset pricing model.
Next, we discuss the relation between stock liquidity, liquidity risk, and expected stock returns
based on a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (liquidity-adjusted CAPM). Finally,
we develop our hypothesis by interlinking financial constraints, stock liquidity, liquidity risk,
and stock returns.
2.1 Related literature about asymmetric information with financial
constraints and stock liquidity
The impact of asymmetric information on corporate investment has been extensively stud-
ied in the literature. Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that ex-
ternal debt finance is more costly than internal funds due to an adverse selection problem
documented by Akerlof (1970). Greenwald et al. (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue
that the adverse selection problem makes external equity finance even more expensive because
stock issues convey bad news and lead to a decline in stock price and an increase in issue costs.
Morellec and Schürhoff (2011) extend this body of work and show that the adverse selection
problems are more severe for financially constrained firms, which significantly affects the value,
the cost of external capital, and investment behavior of financially constrained firms.
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On the other hand, a number of studies have documented that asymmetric information
impacts stock liquidity. For example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and
O’Hara (1987), Admati and Pfeiderer (1988), Glosten and Harris (1988), and Brennan and
Subrahmanyan (1995) show that the adverse selection problem in the marketplace can decrease
stock liquidity, which can be captured by price impact and trading volume. Easley et al.
(1996) propose a measure of the probability of information-based trading that reflects the
adverse selection cost due to asymmetric information between traders. They find a negative
relation between the probability of information-based trading and liquidity for infrequently-
traded stocks. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) use disclosure of private information as a
proxy for reducing information asymmetry. They show that reducing information asymmetry
can increase a firm’s liquidity and reduce its cost of capital. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)
document that stock liquidity is the major link between information asymmetry and share
prices. Overall, research findings indicate that financial constraints are likely to be highly
correlated with stock liquidity because both are heavily influenced by asymmetric information.
2.2 The investment-based model with financial constraints
Gomes et al. (2006) and Whited and Wu (2006) develop the investment-based model with
financial constraints as follows,
RIi,t+1 =
(1 + λi,t+1){ΠK(Ki,t+1, Xi,t+1)− ΦK(Ii,t+1, Ki,t+1) + (1− θi)[ΦI(Ii,t+1, Ki,t+1) + 1]}




where RIi,t+1 is the investment return from t to t + 1, λi,t is the Lagrange multiplier asso-
ciated with the constraint which can be interpreted as the shadow cost of external capital,
Π(Ki,t, Xi,t) is the available funds function (ΠK > 0), Ki,t is the capital stock at time t, Xi,t is
a vector of exogenous shocks, Φ(Ii,t, Ki,t) is the adjusted cost function (ΦI > 0, ΦK < 0, and




represents the relative shadow cost of external capital, which reflects the role of
financing frictions, when λi,t+1 = λi,t, financing frictions have no impact on the investment
return RI . Equation (1) indicates that the investment return is highly related to the relative
shadow cost of external capital. Also, financial constraints can only affect investment returns
if they are time-varying, where λi,t+1 6= λi,t.
2.3 The liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive the liquidity-adjusted CAPM that captures three
forms of liquidity risk: the commonality in liquidity of Chordia et al. (2000), the sensitivity
of stock return to the market liquidity of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and the sensitivity
of stock liquidity to market returns, which can be specified as follows,
E [Ri, t+1 −Rf, t+1] = E [tci, t+1] + E [Rm,t+1 − tcm, t+1 −Rf, t+1] (β1 + β2 + β3 + βAP ), (2)
where Ri,t+1 is the gross return before transaction costs on stock i, Rf,t+1 is the risk-free
rate, tci,t+1 is the relative time-varying transaction costs on stock i and represents stock
liquidity, Rm,t+1 is the market gross return before transaction costs, tcm,t+1 is the relative




V ar(Rm, t+1−tcm, t+1) represents the market risk, β2 =
Cov(tci, t+1,tcm, t+1)
V ar(Rm, t+1−tcm, t+1) represents the
commonality in liquidity of stock i, β3 =
Cov(−Ri, t+1,tcm, t+1)
V ar(Rm, t+1−tcm, t+1) represents the liquidity risk as the
sensitivity of stock returns to the market liquidity, and βAP =
Cov(−tci, t+1,Rm, t+1)
V ar(Rm, t+1−tcm, t+1) represents
the liquidity risk of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) as the sensitivity of stock liquidity to market
returns.
2.4 The links between financial constraints, stock liquidity, liquid-
ity risk, and stock returns
Combining Equations (1) and (2), we can have
E [Ri,t+1] = Rf, t+1 + E [tci, t+1] + E [Rm,t+1 − tcm, t+1 −Rf, t+1] (β1 + β2 + β3 + βAP )
=
(1 + λi,t+1){ΠK(Ki,t+1, Xi,t+1)− ΦK(Ii,t+1, Ki,t+1) + (1− θi)[ΦI(Ii,t+1, Ki,t+1) + 1]}
(1 + λi,t)[ΦI(Ii,t, Ki,t) + 1]
.
(3)
According to Equation (3), holding everything else fixed, the stock liquidity (tci, t+1), the
commonality in liquidity (β2), and the liquidity risks (β3 and βAP ) of stock i are closely re-
lated to financial constraints, measured by
1+λi,t+1
1+λit
.7 Financial constraints capture investment
friction on the firms’ side, while stock liquidity captures trading frictions on the investors’
side. Empirical findings show that they are likely to be highly correlated and both of them
have an impact on stock returns. We, therefore, hypothesize that there is an interaction effect
between financial constraints and stock liquidity on stock returns.
7According to Gomes et al. (2006) and Whited and Wu (2006),
1+λi,t+1
1+λit
is related to the shadow cost of the
constraint today, relative to tomorrow. They emphasize the cyclical role of financial constraints in asset pricing.
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3 Data and Measures
Following Fazzari et al. (1988), our sample consists of manufacturing firms (SIC codes
between 2000 and 3999) traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for the period 1975-
2017. We collect annual firm-level accounting data from the COMPUSTAT database annual
files and use Standard & Poor’s (S&P ) Long-term and Short-term Domestic Issuer Credit
Ratings as bond and commercial paper ratings. The ratings are available on COMPUSTAT
from 1985. We also obtain the monthly stock returns and daily data for estimating stock
liquidity from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The CRSP delisting returns
have been adjusted in our dataset. For stocks without the CRSP delisting returns, we follow
the method of Shumway (1997). We extract the monthly return series of the Fama-French
three factors from Kenneth French’s website.8 The return series of the liquidity risk factor of
Sadka (2006) is obtained from Sadka’s website,9 and the rates of a ten-year Baa bond and a
one-year Treasury bill are taken from the Federal Reserve Board.
3.1 Proxies for financial constraints
Following Almeida et al. (2004), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Hahn and Lee (2009), and
Dasgupta et al. (2019), we use the following four firm characteristic measures and the WW
and HP indices as proxies for financial constraints.
(i) Asset size (AT ): Small firms are likely to have higher costs of financial distress, agency




constraints in raising external capital. We measure asset size as the book value of total
assets (data item AT ). Following Li and Zhang (2010), at the end of June of each year
t, we rank all firms into terciles based on their asset size for the fiscal year ending in the
calendar year t− 1. We classify firms in the bottom tercile of the asset size distribution
as financially constrained firms, and those in the top tercile as unconstrained firms.
(ii) Payout ratio (PR): Fazzari et al. (1988) show that financially constrained firms tend
to pay low dividends because dividends and investment use funds competitively. In
addition, constrained firms are unlikely to produce sufficient internal funds to meet
their investment requirements. Appendix A provides a detailed calculation of the payout
ratio. At the end of June of each year t, we rank all firms into terciles based on their
payout ratios for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t − 1. We classify firms in
the bottom tercile of the payout distribution as financially constrained firms, and those
in the top tercile as financially unconstrained firms.10
(iii) Long-term bond rating (BR): Firms with a long-term bond rating can issue public
debts and face fewer financial constraints than those without do. We classify firms
that have positive debt but have no S&P long-term bond rating during our sample
period as financially constrained firms, and those that have positive debt and S&P
long-term bond rating as financially unconstrained firms. We then define BR as zero
for constrained firms and one for unconstrained firms.
10Following Hahn and Lee (2009), when sorting firms based on their payout ratio, we exclude firms with zero payout
or negative net income. Then, we assign those firms with zero payout or negative net income to the constrained firms.
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(iv) Commercial paper rating (CR): Like long-term bond rating, firms without a commercial
paper rating are unable to issue short-term public debt because of their higher default
risk. We classify firms that have positive debt but have no S&P commercial paper
rating during our sample period as financially constrained firms, and those that have
positive debt and S&P commercial paper rating as financially unconstrained firms. We
define CR as zero for constrained firms and one for unconstrained firms.
(v) WW index (WW ) is calculated by a linear combination of firm characteristics following
Whited and Wu (2006). Appendix B describes full construction for the WW index of
a firm. At the end of June of each year t, we rank all firms into terciles based on their
WW index for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t− 1. We classify firms in the
top tercile as financially constrained firms, and those in the bottom tercile as financially
unconstrained firms.
(vi) HP index (HP ) is computed by a linear combination of asset size and age following
Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Appendix B describes complete construction for the HP
index of a firm. At the end of June of each year t, we rank all firms into terciles based
on their HP index for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t− 1. We classify firms
in the top tercile as financially constrained firms, and those in the bottom tercile as
financially unconstrained firms.
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3.2 Measures of stock liquidity
We employ three individual liquidity measures of the quoted bid-ask spread, price impact,
and turnover ratio. We calculate each measure as the average of the daily measures over the
prior 12 months. We also estimate the first principal component of three individual liquidity
measures following Korajczyk and Sadka (2008).
(i) Quoted bid-ask spread (BA) is the difference between the ask and bid prices on a
particular day divided by the average ask and bid prices on that day.11 Stocks with
high BA are illiquid because of their high transaction costs.
(ii) Price impact (PI) is the daily absolute return-to-dollar-volume ratio. The price impact
of a stock reflects the response of the transaction price to the trading volume and
captures the liquidity effects of asymmetric information.12 Stocks with high PI are
illiquid since their transaction prices respond more to trading volume.
(iii) Turnover ratio (TO) is the ratio of the number of shares traded to the number of shares
outstanding. Turnover ratio captures trading frequency. Stocks with high TO are more
liquid than stocks with low TO.13
11For NYSE/AMEX stocks, the CRSP daily bid and ask prices are the closing bid and closing ask prices on the
day, whereas NASDAQ uses the inside quotation as the bid and ask prices. When the bid or ask prices of a stock are
not available on a day, we use Bid or Low price, or Ask or High price from the CRSP as the bid and ask prices for
the stock, respectively. Due to the limited availability of bid and ask prices, the BA measure is calculated based on
available bid and ask prices in the prior 12 months.
12Hasbrouck (2009) and Goyenko et al. (2009) report that BA and PI estimated using the low-frequency CRSP
data are highly correlated with those using high-frequency data from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) Database and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 605.
13Similar to Amihud (2002), we calculate PI by requiring it to have at least 80% non-missing daily trading volumes
available in the prior 12 months. Also, we exclude zero trading volume over the prior 12 months. To construct TO, we
require no missing daily trading volumes in the prior 12 months following Liu (2006).
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(iv) The principal component of liquidity (PCLIQ) is the first principal component of three
individual liquidity measures, including quoted bid-ask spread, price impact, and neg-
ative turnover ratio. Stocks with high PCLIQ are less liquid than stocks with low
PCLIQ.
3.3 Measures of liquidity risk
In this study, we use two liquidity risk measures of Sadka (2006) and Acharya and Pedersen
(2005).
(i) The Sadka (2006) liquidity risk measure, βSadka, is estimated as the sensitivity of stock
returns to unexpected changes in market liquidity. Sadka (2006) develops the liquidity
risk factors based on the transitory-fixed and permanent-variable components of price
impact. The fixed component of price impact is driven by a transitory price change in
response to market-making costs. The variable component is due to a permanent price
change that is related to a change in its perceived intrinsic value. The fixed and variable
liquidity risk factors are based on the innovations of the market-wide components.
(ii) The Acharya and Pedersen (2005) liquidity risk measure, βAP , is computed as the
sensitivity of stock liquidity to market returns. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive
this measure from their liquidity-adjusted CAPM in Equation (2).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients across the proxies of
financial constraints and the measures of stock liquidity. The means of bond rating (BR) and
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commercial paper rating (CR) suggest that, on average, only 37.1% and 14.7% of manufac-
turing firms have a bond and commercial paper ratings, respectively, so they are financially
unconstrained firms. The WW and HP indices are negatively correlated with asset size (AT ),
with the correlation coefficients of −0.852 and −0.89, indicating that firms with high WW
or HP indices have small asset size. Consistent with Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei
(2011), the constraint proxies of AT , payout ratio (PR), BR, and CR are negatively corre-
lated with the stock liquidity measures of quoted bid-ask spread (BA), price impact (PI), and
principal component of liquidity (PCLIQ), while WW and HP are positively correlated with
these liquidity measures. The results suggest that financially constrained firms are illiquid.
In other words, trading on firms with small asset size, low payout ratio, without bond and
commercial paper ratings, or firms with high WW and HP indices is characterized by large
transaction costs with high bid-ask spread, price impact, and principal component of liquidity.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis of financially constrained and unconstrained
firms
Table 2 presents summary statistics on various firm characteristics of financially con-
strained and unconstrained firms under each of the six proxies. The letter U represents
the financially unconstrained group that contains firms in the top tercile of AT or PR, firms
in the bottom tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have BR or CR. The letter C represents
the constrained group that contains firms in the bottom tercile of AT or PR, or firms in the
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top tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have no BR or CR. Appendix A provides detailed
descriptions of firm characteristics. In line with a number of studies, financially constrained
firms tend to be small and value firms with lower market value (MV ) and higher book-to-
market ratio (B/M).14 They have more investment opportunities (higher Tobin’s Q) but
generate lower cash flows (negative CF ) and profits from their operations (PF ). Moreover,
constrained firms have substantially higher standard deviations (SD) of CF and PF than
those of unconstrained firms. As a result, they are likely to be difficult to raise debt capi-
tal, and therefore, they hold more cash (CH). On the other hand, unconstrained firms have
more tangible assets (TA) and produce higher profits. They borrow more debt with higher
leverage (BL) except for unconstrained PR firms, indicating that unconstrained firms have
lower financial distress costs and follow the trade-off theory in making their capital structure
decisions.
Table 3 reports the return performance and the measures of stock liquidity and liquidity
risk for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. C-U represents the difference in the
estimated variables between the constrained and unconstrained groups. Panel A presents the
monthly average excess returns and abnormal returns. The excess return is the return that
subtracts the risk-free rate from the raw return. The abnormal return (FF3 alpha) is the
intercept of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (hereafter FF3) as follows,
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,MKT (Rm,t −Rf,t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εi,t, (4)
14See, for example, Fazzari et al. (1988), Almeida et al. (2004), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Denis and Sibilkov
(2010), Hahn and Lee (2009), Livdan et al. (2009), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
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where Ri,t is the return on stock i in month t, Rf,t is the one-month Treasury bill rate,
and Rm,t is the value-weighted market return on all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ. SMBt (small-minus-big) and HMLt (high-minus-low) are the returns on the
mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market equity.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the return patterns of financially constrained and uncon-
strained firms vary depending on the proxies of financial constraints. For instance, financially
constrained AT , WW , and HP firms have higher excess returns and FF3 alphas than un-
constrained AT , WW , and HP firms, while constrained BR and CR firms have lower ex-
cess returns and FF3 alphas than unconstrained corresponding firms, but most of them are
statistically insignificant. The results are in line with the empirical findings on the mixed
relations between financial constraints and stock returns reported by the literature.15 The re-
sults in Panel B of Table 3 suggest that financially constrained firms tend to be illiquid firms
with higher bid-ask spread (BA), price impact (PI), and principal component of liquidity
(PCLIQ), while unconstrained firms are liquid firms with lower BA, PI, and PCLIQ. For
instance, financially unconstrained AT firms have an average BA of 1.57, PI of 0.23, and
PCLIQ of -0.36, while constrained AT firms have an average BA of 8.65, PI of 17.67, and
PCLIQ of 0.47.
15We also follow Campello and Chen (2010) and estimate a composite financial constraint measure based on six
financial constraint proxies of AT , PR, BR, CR, WW , and HP . We find that financially constrained portfolio
significantly outperforms unconstrained portfolio based on the composite financial constraint measure.
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Clearly, the degree of stock liquidity is different between financially constrained and un-
constrained firms. We, therefore, investigate liquidity risk for financially constrained and
unconstrained firms. The liquidity risk measure, βSadka, is estimated as follows,
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,MKT (Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,SadkaLIQSadka,t + εi,t, (5)
where LIQSadka,t denotes the Sadka’s (2006) liquidity factor based on the fixed component of
price impact.
Panel C of Table 3 reports βi,Sadka and βi,AP for financially constrained and unconstrained
firms. The results show that constrained firms have a higher magnitude of liquidity risk
than unconstrained firms. For example, βi,Sadka and βi,AP are, respectively, 1.79 and 0.37 for
financially unconstrained AT firms, while they are 4.73 and 3.04 for constrained AT firms.
The results in Table 3 suggest that financially constrained firms have higher liquidity risk
in terms of βi,Sadka and βi,AP than unconstrained firms. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show
that the commonality in stock liquidity documented by Chordia et al. (2000) and Hasbrouck
and Seppi (2001) is another important form of liquidity risk. We then further explore liquidity
commonality across financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Following Acharya and
Pedersen (2005), we estimate the liquidity commonality (β2) as the sensitivity of stock liquidity
to market liquidity from the following equation,
ui,m = b0 + β2uMKT,m + ei,m, (6)
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where ui,m denotes the liquidity innovation of an individual stock or a portfolio i in the month
m and uMKT,m denotes the market liquidity innovation. They are the residuals of the following
regressions,
LIQi,m = α0 + αiLIQi,m−1 + ui,m, (7)
LIQMKT,m = α0 + αiLIQMKT,m−1 + uMKT,m, (8)
where LIQi,m is the average of a liquidity measure of an individual stock or portfolio i in the
month m, and LIQMKT,m is the cross-sectional average of the same liquidity measure of all
stocks in the month m. The rationale for using liquidity innovations rather than liquidity
changes is due to the argument of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) that liquidity is persistent
and liquidity changes might induce bias in risk measures.
Table 4 presents the results of the coefficients on liquidity commonality (β2) for finan-
cially constrained and unconstrained firms. Following Chordia et al. (2000), we report the
coefficients for individual stocks and portfolios under each of the six proxies of financial con-
straints and four stock liquidity measures.16 With only a few exceptions, the coefficients are
statistically significant at the 5% level. In addition, financially constrained firms generally
have greater coefficients on liquidity commonality in both magnitude and significance than
unconstrained firms have. For instance, the liquidity commonality coefficient, β2, is 0.366 (t
= 3.86) for unconstrained BA firms and 1.407 (t = 4.82) for constrained BA firms based on
portfolios, indicating that constrained firms have stronger liquidity commonality than uncon-
16As the numbers of individual stocks in the financially unconstrained and constrained groups are different, this
causes the issues in the calculation of the difference in liquidity commonality between the constrained and unconstrained
groups.
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strained firms have. Overall, our results suggest that financially constrained firms have higher
liquidity risk than unconstrained firms have.
4.2 Two-way portfolio sorts
Our prior results raise two questions (1) whether financially constrained firms with higher
liquidity risk earn a higher illiquidity premium than unconstrained firms, and (2) whether
illiquid firms with more financial constraints produce a higher financial constraint premium
than liquid firms. To examine these questions, we use a two-way portfolio sorts approach.
At the end of each month of year t, we sort all stocks in the sample into terciles and form
three portfolios based on their one-month lagged principal component of liquidity measure
using NYSE breakpoints. Independently, we sort all stocks into two portfolios based on their
proxies of financial constraints for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t− 1. Therefore,
each stock is assigned to one of six portfolios. We hold the portfolios for the subsequent month
and rebalance them monthly.
Table 5 reports the abnormal returns of the FF3 for two-way sorted portfolios. “Liquid”
represents a portfolio that comprises firms in the bottom tercile of the principal component
of liquidity measure. “Illiquid” represents a portfolio that comprises firms in the top tercile
of the principal component of liquidity measure. I-L stands for the illiquidity premium as
the difference in returns between illiquid and liquid portfolios. “Unconstrained” denotes a
portfolio that contains firms with high AT or PR, firms with low WW or HP , or firms
that have BR or CR. “Constrained” denotes a portfolio that contains firms with low AT
or PR, firms with high WW or HP , or firms that have no BR or CR. C-U represents the
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financial constraint premium as the difference in returns between financially constrained and
unconstrained portfolios.
Holding the principal component of liquidity fixed, financially constrained firms signif-
icantly underperform unconstrained firms in liquid portfolios under four out of six proxies
of financial constraints (except for the proxies of AT and WW index). However, in illiquid
portfolios, financially constrained firms uniformly outperform unconstrained firms, but most
of them are statistically insignificant. For example, the financial constraint premium (C-U)
is −0.538% (t = -3.49) per month for liquid portfolio and is 0.062% (t = 0.36) per month
for illiquid portfolio under BR proxy. The results show a negative relation between financial
constraints and stock returns for liquid portfolios and a positive relation for illiquid portfolios,
indicating that the mixed relations are conditional on stock liquidity.
Sorting on the principal component of liquidity and holding financial constraints fixed,
illiquid firms significantly outperform liquid firms in financially constrained portfolios but
insignificantly outperform liquid firms in financially unconstrained portfolios regardless of the
proxies of financial constraints. For instance, the illiquidity premium (I-L) is 0.105% (t = 0.81)
per month for unconstrained AT portfolio and is 0.826% (t = 4.40) per month for constrained
AT portfolio. The results suggest that financially constrained firms earn higher illiquidity
premiums than unconstrained firms do.
4.3 Cross-sectional regressions
The findings in Table 5 motivate us to examine the pricing of stock liquidity across finan-
cially constrained and unconstrained firms as well as an interaction effect between financial
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constraints and stock liquidity. Fama and French (2008) argue that although the portfolio
sorts approach provides a clear pattern of returns across different portfolios, it is hard to pre-
cisely identify the explanatory variables for average returns. In this subsection, we first explore
the pricing of stock liquidity by running Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for
financially constrained and unconstrained firms, respectively. Next, we investigate the inter-
action effect between financial constraints and stock liquidity on stock returns. Finally, we
examine the interaction effect of the business cycle.
4.3.1 The impact of stock liquidity on stock returns for financially constrained
and unconstrained firms
Fama and French (2008) point out that regression estimates based on all stocks can be
driven by stocks with extreme values of the explanatory variables and extreme returns. To
avoid this problem, we split the full sample into the financially constrained and unconstrained
subsamples using the same sorting approach as that in Table 2. For each month, we run the
following Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for the financially constrained and
unconstrained subsamples,
Ri,t+1 −Rf, t+1 = γ0 + γ1PCLIQi,t + γ2MVi,t + γ3B/Mi,t + γ4MOMi,t + εi,t+1, (9)
where Ri,t+1 is the monthly raw returns from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, Rf, t+1 is the
risk-free rate, PCLIQ is the lagged first principal component of liquidity, MV is the market
value of equity at the end of June of year t, B/M is the book value of equity for the fiscal year
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ending in year t− 1, divided by market value of equity at the end of December in year t− 1
from the CRSP, and MOM is the cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous six
months. We transform each regressor into a standardized variable with a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one.17
Table 6 presents the estimates for the subsamples. Regardless of the proxies of financial
constraints and the control variables, the coefficients on PCLIQ are uniformly positive at the
1% significance level for the financially constrained subsamples. For the unconstrained sub-
samples, the coefficients on PCLIQ are not distinguishable from zero. For instance, including
the control variables, the coefficient on PCLIQ is 0.537 (t = 4.83) for the constrained WW
subsample and −0.084 (t = -1.09) for the unconstrained WW subsample. The results indi-
cate that stock liquidity is strongly priced in the cross-section of stock returns for financially
constrained firms, but is not priced at all for unconstrained firms.
4.3.2 The interaction effect between financial constraints and stock liquidity on
stock returns
Our previous results, as reported in Tables 5 and 6, suggest that financial constraints and
stock liquidity are likely to have an interaction effect on stock returns. We, therefore, inves-
tigate this effect by conducting the following Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression
for the full sample,
17We use the standardized variables for Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions throughout the paper.
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Ri,t+1 −Rf, t+1 = γ0 + γ1FCi,t + γ2PCLIQi,t + γ3FC × PCLIQi,t + γ4MVi,t
+ γ5B/Mi,t + γ6MOMi,t + εi,t+1, (10)
where FC is the lagged financial constraints proxy, which is the actual value of AT , PR,
WW , or HP , zero for constrained BR or CR firms, or one for unconstrained BR or CR
firms. FC × PCLIQ is an interaction term between financial constraints and the principal
component of liquidity.
Table 7 reports the regression estimates under each of the six proxies of financial con-
straints. In the first regression model, the coefficients on FC do not differ from zero for five
out of six proxies except for the WW index, suggesting that financial constraints are not
independently priced in the cross-section of stock returns. In the second regression model, the
coefficient on PCLIQ is significantly positive, with a coefficient of 0.303 (t = 3.42), indicating
that stock liquidity is strongly priced in stock returns. More importantly, the estimates from
the third regression model show that the coefficients on FC × PCLIQ are significant at the
5% level for five out of six proxies (the only exception is under AT proxy). The results are in
line with our hypothesis that there is a strong interaction effect between financial constraints
and stock liquidity on stock returns.
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4.3.3 The interaction effect over the business cycle
In this section, we extend our investigation from the findings of Table 7 and examine
whether the interaction effect between financial constraints and stock liquidity on stock returns
varies over the business cycle. Fama and French (1989) find that the term spread and default
spread are highly related to short-term and long-term variations in business conditions. These
spreads are high during the periods of recessions and low during the periods of economic
growth. To capture both effects of term spread and default spread on business conditions, we
estimate a total spread as the sum of term spread plus default spread that is the difference
between the yields on a ten-year corporate Baa bond and a one-year Treasury bill.18 We define
a good economic time as a period that has a negative change in the total spread, and define a
bad economic time as a period that has a positive change in the total spread.19 We split the
full sample into the good and bad economic time subsamples.
Table 8 reports the estimates of the cross-sectional regressions for the good and bad eco-
nomic time subsamples. We use the same independent variables as those in Table 7. Table
8 shows that the coefficients on FC are generally insignificant in both of the good and bad
economic time subsamples in the first regression model (except for BR and CR proxies in bad
times and AT and the WW index proxies in good times). The results confirm our previous
finding in Table 7 that financial constraints are not independently priced either in good or
bad economic times. In the second regression model, the coefficient on PCLIQ is signifi-
18Petkova (2006) measures the term spread as the difference between the yields on a ten-year government bond and
a one-year Treasury bill and calculates the default spread as the difference between the yields on a ten-year corporate
Baa bond and a ten-year government bond.
19We also use the classification of the NBER’s business cycle. The estimated results are biased because the NBER’s
business cycle only contains 69 months of recession months, but contains 399 months of non-recession months.
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cantly positive for the good time subsample (with the coefficient of 0.343 and t = 3.18) and
marginally significant for the bad time subsample (with the coefficient of 0.255 and t = 1.72).
The results imply that stock liquidity is strongly priced in good times. After including the
interaction term in the third regression model, the coefficients on FC × PCLIQ are at the
5% significance level under the proxies of PR, BR, WW , and HP indices and at the 10%
level under BR proxy in the bad time subsample, but they are insignificant in the good time
subsample except for the WW index proxy. For instance, the coefficient on FC × PCLIQ
is −0.476 (t = -2.03) in the bad time subsample and is −0.168 (t = -0.91) in the good time
subsample under PR proxy. Overall, our results suggest that stock liquidity is independently
priced in good times. In bad times, stock liquidity is generally priced in conjunction with
financial constraints.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of stock liquidity in explaining the mixed relations between
financial constraints and stock returns and the pricing of stock liquidity between financially
constrained and unconstrained firms. We find that financial constraints are negatively related
to stock returns for liquid portfolios and positively related to stock returns for illiquidity
portfolios. The negative relation is driven by lower returns on constrained-liquid firms, while
the positive relation is due to higher returns on constrained-illiquid firms. The possible reasons
might be due to investors’ different attitudes toward financial constraints for liquid and illiquid
firms. Specifically, investors view that financial constraints are less risky for liquid firms,
but are riskier in terms of liquidity risk for illiquid firms. Therefore, they require lower
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returns on constrained-liquid firms and demand higher returns on constrained-illiquid firms to
compensate for high liquidity risk, leading to the mixed relations between financial constraints
and stock returns for liquid and illiquid portfolios.
We also find the strong interaction effect between financial constraints and stock liquidity
on stock returns, particularly in bad economic times. Our findings have important implica-
tions for policymakers in making capital structure, cash holding, dividend payouts, financing,
and investment decisions. During a recession period, the stock prices of financially constrained
firms respond significantly to stock liquidity. Moreover, financial constraints are likely to bind
more due to tight credit conditions. Raising external capital is costly. Therefore, financially
constrained firms could reserve more cash from their cash flows to protect themselves against
bad economic conditions and smooth their investment. On the other hand, financially uncon-
strained firms could follow the market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) by issuing
more debt or repurchasing their own shares.
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Appendix A: Firm characteristics
BL: book leverage, the ratio of the sum of long-term debt (data item DLTT ) and debt in
current liabilities (data item DLC) to the book value of equity.
B/M : book-to-market equity, the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of
equity. Following Davis et al. (2000), the book value of equity is calculated as the stockholders’
equity (data item SEQ), plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (data
item TXDITC) (if available), less book value of preferred stock (in the following order: data
item PSTKRV or data item PSTKL or data item PSTK) from the COMPUSTAT database.
The B/M ratio of year t is the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t − 1,
divided by market value at the end of December in year t− 1 from the CRSP.
CF : cash flow, calculated as a ratio of operating income before depreciation (data item
OIBDP ) less the sum of interest expenses (data item XINT ), income taxes (data item
TXT ), dividends of preferred shares (data item DV P ), and dividends of common shares
(data item DV C) to the book value of total assets.
CH: cash holdings, the ratio of cash and short-term investments (data item CHE) to the
book value of total assets.
MV : market capitalization of equity, calculated by the share price at the end of June in year
t times the number of shares outstanding from the CRSP.
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PF : profitability, computed as the ratio of the operating income before depreciation (data
item OIBDP ) to the book value of total assets.
PR: payout ratio as the total distributions including dividends paid to preferred stocks (data
item DV P ), common stocks (data item DV C), and share repurchases (data item PRSTKC)
divided by the operating income before depreciation (data item OIBDP ).
Q: Tobin’s Q, calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of total
assets. The market value of assets is equal to the book value of total assets (data item AT )
plus the market value of common equity at the end of December in year t from the CRSP less
the sum of the book value of common equity (data item CEQ) and balance sheet deferred
taxes (data item TXDB).
TA: tangible asset, defined as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (data item
PPENT ) to the book value of total assets.
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Appendix B: The WW and HP indices
WW : Whited and Wu’s (2006) index is calculated as
WW = −0.091CF − 0.062DIV POS + 0.021TLTD − 0.044LNTA
+ 0.102ISG− 0.035SG, (A-1)
where CF is the ratio of income before depreciation (data item IB + DP ) to total assets,
DIV POS is an indicator that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends to preferred
stocks or common stocks, TLTD is the ratio of sum of long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities to total assets, LNTA is the natural log of total asset, ISG is the firm’s three-digit
industry sales growth, and SG is the sales (data item SALE) growth of a firm.
HP : Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) index is computed as
HP = −0.737Size+ 0.043Size2 − 0.040Age, (A-2)
where Size is the log of inflation-adjusted book assets, and Age is the number of years that
the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on COMPUSTAT. To calculate this index,
Size is winsorized at the log of $4.5 billion, and Age is winsorized at 37 years.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table reports the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min), median, maximum (Max), and correlation
coefficients between the proxies of financial constraints and the stock liquidity measures. We use asset size (AT ),
payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices as the proxies for
financial constraints. Appendix B provides detailed constructions of the WW and HP indices. We use three individual
liquidity measures of the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %), price impact (PI, 106), and turnover ratio (TO), and a
principal component of liquidity measure (PCLIQ) as the first principal component of the quoted bid-ask spread,
price impact, and negative turnover ratio. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017
for the rest.
AT PR BR CR WW HP BA PI TO PCLIQ
Descriptive statistics
Mean 1631 0.032 0.371 0.147 -0.206 -3.129 5.167 6.848 0.540 -0.048
SD 10641 31.445 0.483 0.354 1.647 0.982 8.252 59.449 0.778 1.103
Min 0.113 -8089 0.000 0.000 -412.291 -4.637 0.010 0.000 0.000 -20.133
Median 100 0.042 0.000 0.000 -0.223 -3.182 2.547 0.169 0.301 -0.142
Max 648349 758.100 1.000 1.000 14.961 1.348 189.824 6749.815 42.074 43.598
Spearman’s rank correlation
PR 0.485 1.000
BR 0.697 0.338 1.000
CR 0.559 0.384 0.522 1.000
WW -0.852 -0.570 -0.601 -0.532 1.000
HP -0.890 -0.532 -0.626 -0.537 0.803 1.000
BA -0.738 -0.390 -0.476 -0.402 0.623 0.666 1.000
PI -0.802 -0.399 -0.593 -0.531 0.671 0.702 0.901 1.000
TO 0.191 -0.082 0.165 0.066 -0.079 -0.079 -0.446 -0.524 1.000
PCLIQ -0.497 -0.152 -0.335 -0.216 0.374 0.401 0.812 0.802 -0.795 1.000
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Table 2: Firm characteristics across the financially constrained and unconstrained groups
This table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics across the financially constrained and unconstrained groups.
We use asset size (AT ), payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices
as the proxies for financial constraints. At the end of June of each year t, we sort stocks into terciles based on their AT ,
PR, WW , or HP , or sort stocks into two groups based on their BR or CR for the fiscal year ending in the calendar
year t− 1. “U” represents the financially unconstrained group that contains firms in the top tercile of AT or PR, firms
in the bottom tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have BR or CR. “C” represents the financially constrained group
that contains firms in the bottom tercile of AT or PR, firms in the top tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have no BR
or CR. The variables of firm characteristics are the market value (MV , in $millions), book-to-market ratio (B/M),
cash flow ratio (CF ), cash holdings (CH), book leverage (BL), Tobin’s Q (Q), tangible asset (TA), and profitability
(PF ). See Appendix A for detailed definitions of firm characteristics. The reported mean is the time-series average of
the cross-sectional mean. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the rest.
Financial Constraints Proxy
AT PR BR CR WW HP
U C U C U C U C U C U C
MV Mean 5457 50 5630 544 6250 268 13678 564 5325 365 5092 83
SD 22099 132 24745 5067 22564 993 34172 2662 22216 5176 21873 715
Min 2 0 0 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 2 0
Median 800 16 277 48 977 56 3448 86 730 19 628 19
Max 715600 6398 715600 547363 715600 51875 715600 172459 715600 273268 715600 104000
B/M Mean 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.69 0.79 0.56 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.79 0.79
SD 1.09 0.92 0.84 1.10 1.10 0.98 1.18 1.05 1.05 1.02 0.88 1.06
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.58 0.51 0.61 0.57 0.47 0.55 0.41 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.49
Max 41.59 19.10 35.35 41.59 41.59 28.51 35.35 41.59 35.35 25.52 35.13 34.64
CF Mean 0.07 -0.14 0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.07 -0.12 0.07 -0.15
SD 0.07 0.49 0.12 0.36 0.10 0.33 0.07 0.31 0.09 0.43 0.07 0.50
Min -2.73 -24.00 -9.65 -24.00 -3.65 -10.12 -2.68 -11.12 -2.79 -24.00 -2.73 -24.00
Median 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.01
Max 0.54 1.71 0.70 1.71 0.76 1.69 0.67 1.69 1.69 0.95 0.67 1.71
CH Mean 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.26
SD 0.13 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.27
Min -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Median 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.15
Max 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.88 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00
BL Mean 1.00 0.57 0.49 0.93 0.99 0.59 0.96 0.68 0.77 0.59 1.04 0.51
SD 48.64 14.74 6.73 41.31 44.48 12.15 17.34 29.05 17.70 17.10 53.73 16.62
Min -1074.19 -1154.83 -580.76 -1473.10 -2618.35 -1154.83 -466.33 -2618.35 -633.84 -1473.10 -2618.35 -1473.10
Median 0.51 0.15 0.29 0.32 0.60 0.29 0.57 0.34 0.47 0.21 0.46 0.16
Max 7329.29 1149.33 232.04 7329.29 3096.64 753.73 960.50 3096.64 2183.59 1149.33 7329.29 837.96
Q Mean 1.55 2.80 1.65 2.19 1.68 2.10 1.77 2.01 1.56 2.47 1.53 2.84
SD 1.11 4.22 1.17 3.19 1.09 2.51 1.05 2.41 1.15 3.32 1.02 4.19
Min 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.26 0.12
Median 1.26 1.56 1.30 1.35 1.39 1.41 1.49 1.38 1.26 1.48 1.25 1.62
Max 44.16 142.82 23.21 142.82 22.48 76.58 15.75 99.23 30.34 142.82 23.28 142.82
TA Mean 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.31 0.21 0.30 0.20
SD 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.17 0.27 0.16
Max 0.92 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.88 0.99 0.84 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.93 1.00
PF Mean 0.15 -0.10 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.15 -0.08 0.15 -0.11
SD 0.08 0.50 0.10 0.37 0.11 0.35 0.08 0.33 0.10 0.43 0.08 0.50
Min -0.92 -18.87 0.00 -18.87 -3.08 -18.28 -2.65 -18.28 -2.51 -18.87 -0.64 -18.87
Median 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.04
Max 1.93 3.25 3.25 1.71 1.39 1.70 0.97 1.70 1.93 1.25 0.97 3.25
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Table 3: The return, stock liquidity, and liquidity risk across the financially constrained and unconstrained groups
This table reports the monthly return performance in Panel A, the stock liquidity measures in Panel B and the liquidity risk measures in Panel C across
the financially constrained and unconstrained groups. We use asset size (AT ), payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper rating (CR),
the WW, and HP indices as the proxies for financial constraints. At the end of June of each year t, we sort stocks into terciles based on their AT , PR,
WW , or HP , or sort stocks into two groups based on their BR or CR for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t− 1. “U” represents the financially
unconstrained group that contains firms in the top tercile of AT or PR, firms in the bottom tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have BR or CR. “C”
represents the financially constrained group that contains firms in the bottom tercile of AT or PR, firms in the top tercile of WW or HP , or firms that
have no BR or CR. “C-U” represents the difference in the estimated variables between the constrained and unconstrained groups. The excess return
is the return that exceeds the risk-free rate. The FF3 alpha is the intercept of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, which represents the
abnormal return after adjusting for the Fama and French (1993) three factors. We report three individual liquidity measures of the quoted bid-ask spread
(BA, %), price impact (PI, 106), and turnover ratio (TO), and a principal component of liquidity measure (PCLIQ) as the first principal component of
the quoted bid-ask spread, price impact, and negative turnover ratio. βSadka and βAP are the liquidity risk measures of Sadka (2006) and Acharya and
Pedersen (2005), respectively. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the rest.
Financial Constraints Proxy
AT PR BR CR WW HP
U C C-U U C C-U U C C-U U C C-U U C C-U U C C-U
Panel A: Stock returns
Excess Return (%) 0.90 1.11 0.21 0.95 1.01 0.06 1.09 0.88 -0.21 1.03 0.94 -0.09 0.86 1.26 0.41 0.95 0.97 0.02
(3.38) (3.03) (0.92) (4.10) (2.96) (0.36) (3.35) (2.39) (-1.29) (3.77) (2.55) (-0.41) (3.32) (3.41) (1.70) (3.69) (2.57) (0.08)
FF3 alpha (%) -0.02 0.28 0.30 0.16 0.06 -0.10 0.18 0.11 -0.07 0.20 0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.39 0.45 0.04 0.11 0.07
(-0.25) (1.62) (1.67) (2.38) (0.49) (-1.03) (1.86) (0.81) (-0.51) (2.04) (0.93) (-0.63) (-0.74) (2.39) (2.53) (0.58) (0.64) (0.40)
Panel B: Stock illiquidity
BA 1.57 8.65 7.09 3.18 6.26 3.08 1.87 4.68 2.81 0.91 4.23 3.32 1.73 8.12 6.38 1.84 8.43 6.59
(6.39) (7.36) (7.45) (6.57) (6.90) (7.14) (4.62) (5.44) (6.04) (5.14) (5.27) (5.19) (6.34) (7.16) (7.17) (6.73) (7.13) (7.11)
PI 0.23 17.67 17.44 2.87 9.13 6.26 0.81 8.44 7.63 0.02 7.05 7.03 0.31 16.66 16.35 0.47 16.50 16.04
(3.37) (6.27) (6.29) (3.50) (6.10) (5.55) (3.80) (5.52) (5.66) (2.59) (5.67) (5.66) (4.42) (5.99) (5.99) (4.14) (6.31) (6.35)
TO 0.60 0.43 -0.17 0.46 0.55 0.09 0.70 0.58 -0.12 0.60 0.62 0.02 0.54 0.47 -0.07 0.52 0.48 -0.04
(7.05) (8.00) (-2.92) (6.87) (8.53) (3.77) (8.77) (10.22) (-2.84) (7.64) (10.39) (0.59) (6.82) (8.01) (-1.44) (7.11) (7.93) (-0.92)
PCLIQ -0.36 0.47 0.83 -0.14 0.13 0.27 -0.38 0.07 0.45 -0.43 -0.03 0.41 -0.31 0.40 0.71 -0.29 0.41 0.70
(-5.44) (3.81) (8.98) (-2.03) (1.28) (5.94) (-4.90) (0.61) (9.42) (-7.91) (-0.26) (6.02) (-4.68) (3.26) (8.36) (-4.61) (3.21) (7.66)
Panel C: Liquidity beta
βSadka 2.02 5.03 3.01 2.31 4.14 1.83 2.11 4.06 1.94 0.78 3.82 3.04 2.00 4.87 2.87 2.14 4.80 2.67
(2.19) (2.73) (1.93) (2.90) (2.81) (1.89) (2.13) (2.90) (1.99) (0.90) (2.83) (2.30) (2.27) (2.75) (1.91) (2.45) (2.57) (1.63)
βAP 0.37 3.04 2.67 0.74 1.75 1.01 0.60 1.56 0.97 -0.08 1.37 1.45 0.26 2.58 2.32 0.37 2.98 2.61
(0.33) (0.59) (0.64) (0.33) (0.43) (0.53) (0.33) (0.43) (0.50) (-0.10) (0.40) (0.52) (0.21) (0.51) (0.58) (0.30) (0.56) (0.62)
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Table 4: Commonality in liquidity for the financially constrained and unconstrained groups
This table reports the liquidity commonality of individual stocks and portfolios for the financially constrained and
unconstrained groups. We estimate the liquidity commonality (β2) using the following equation,
ui,m = b0 + β2uMKT,m + ei,m,
where ui,m denotes the liquidity innovation of individual stock or portfolio i and uMKT,m denotes the market liquidity
innovation. They are the residual of the following regressions,
LIQi,m = α0 + αiLIQi,m−1 + ui,m
LIQMKT,m = α0 + αiLIQMKT,m−1 + uMKT,m,
where LIQi,m is the stock liquidity measure of an individual stock or a portfolio in the financially unconstrained or
constrained groups in month m, and LIQMKT,m is the corresponding average liquidity measure of all stocks in month
m. We estimate three individual liquidity measures, including the quoted bid-ask spread (BA, %), price impact (PI,
106), and turnover ratio (TO), and a principal component of liquidity measure (PCLIQ). We use asset size (AT ),
payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices as the proxies for
financial constraints. At the end of June of each year t, we sort stocks into terciles based on their AT , PR, WW , or
HP , or sort stocks into two groups based on their BR or CR for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t − 1.
“Unconstrained” represents the financially unconstrained group that contains firms in the top tercile of AT or PR,
firms in the bottom tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have BR or CR. “Constrained” represents the financially
constrained group that contains firms in the bottom tercile of AT or PR, firms in the top tercile of WW or HP , or
firms that have no BR or CR. “C-U” represents the difference between the constrained and unconstrained groups.
The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the rest.
Individual stock Portfolio
BA PI TO PCLIQ BA PI TO PCLIQ
AT as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.291 0.034 0.555 0.280 0.366 0.019 0.398 0.321
(9.41) (4.85) (12.65) (9.22) (3.86) (2.13) (5.08) (3.36)
Constrained 1.075 2.820 1.295 1.509 1.407 2.770 1.813 1.805
(16.86) (4.54) (20.62) (8.36) (4.82) (26.97) (18.96) (13.35)
C-U 1.041 2.750 1.415 1.484
(2.72) (25.01) (8.31) (11.91)
PR as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.370 0.262 0.732 0.344 0.619 0.129 0.494 0.530
(6.81) (3.15) (10.16) (6.67) (4.34) (2.14) (5.16) (10.55)
Constrained 0.798 1.486 1.040 1.036 1.090 1.481 1.372 1.259
(23.13) (4.37) (23.28) (9.45) (8.84) (69.68) (32.13) (20.80)
C-U 0.471 1.352 0.878 0.729
(1.81) (18.70) (7.29) (6.77)
BR as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.410 0.055 0.575 0.414 0.733 0.054 0.549 0.511
(13.89) (2.88) (9.61) (6.85) (8.07) (3.82) (8.09) (17.94)
Constrained 0.983 1.695 1.029 1.184 0.820 1.644 1.335 1.345
(17.20) (3.95) (18.23) (10.66) (4.23) (77.16) (25.33) (9.19)
C-U 0.088 1.590 0.786 0.834
(0.32) (52.92) (6.58) (5.23)
CR as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.237 0.001 0.355 0.260 0.255 0.001 0.333 0.249
(2.72) (1.89) (5.76) (3.41) (3.76) (1.00) (4.64) (2.51)
Constrained 0.876 1.028 0.949 1.039 0.873 1.185 1.122 1.100
(22.54) (5.08) (19.02) (12.04) (8.34) (314.94) (79.57) (18.10)
C-U 0.618 1.184 0.788 0.851
(3.59) (297.28) (9.24) (13.47)
WW as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.344 0.387 0.596 0.442 0.384 0.022 0.441 0.335
(7.52) (1.06) (12.20) (3.12) (3.15) (1.28) (4.94) (4.90)
Constrained 1.002 1.993 1.052 1.212 1.415 2.748 1.683 1.762
(19.84) (3.66) (11.52) (8.67) (4.72) (28.60) (15.20) (11.27)
C-U 1.032 2.725 1.243 1.426
(2.47) (27.17) (6.71) (8.97)
HP as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.340 0.045 0.463 0.230 0.399 0.035 0.331 0.320
(7.97) (4.30) (15.94) (10.64) (4.06) (6.57) (5.28) (4.76)
Constrained 0.961 2.401 1.251 1.392 1.354 2.901 1.846 1.760
(17.91) (4.62) (20.83) (8.73) (4.81) (46.45) (19.38) (13.65)
C-U 0.954 2.866 1.515 1.439
(2.54) (43.80) (9.76) (10.16)
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Table 5: The abnormal returns of portfolios sorted on stock liquidity and financial constraints
This table reports the abnormal returns after adjusting for the Fama and French (1993) three factors for two-way sorted
portfolios based on the principal component of liquidity and financial constraints. At the end of each month of year
t, we sort stocks into three portfolios based on their one-month lagged principal component of liquidity measure using
NYSE breakpoints and independently sort stocks into two portfolios based on their proxies of financial constraints for
the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t− 1. We hold the portfolios for the subsequent month and rebalance them
monthly. The principal component of liquidity measure is estimated from three individual liquidity measures of the
quoted bid-ask spread, price impact, and negative turnover ratio. “Liquid” represents a portfolio that comprises firms
in the bottom tercile of the principal component of liquidity measure. “Illiquid” represents a portfolio that comprises
firms in the top tercile of the principal component of liquidity measure. “I-L” stands for the difference in returns
between the illiquid and liquid portfolios. We use asset size (AT ), payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial
paper rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices as the proxies for financial constraints. “Unconstrained” represents a
financially unconstrained portfolio that contains firms with high AT or PR, firms with low WW or HP , or firms that
have BR or CR. “Constrained” represents a financially constrained portfolio that contains firms with low AT or PR,
firms with high WW or HP , or firms that have no BR or CR. “C-U” represents the difference in returns between the
constrained and unconstrained portfolios. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West’s (1987) standard
errors are in parentheses. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the rest.
Unconstrained Constrained C-U Unconstrained Constrained C-U
AT as a proxy for financial constraints PR as a proxy for financial constraints
Liquid -0.039 -0.223 -0.184 0.086 -0.299 -0.384
(-0.39) (-1.46) (-1.26) (0.99) (-2.51) (-3.28)
Illiquid 0.066 0.603 0.536 0.271 0.309 0.038
(0.64) (3.12) (3.02) (2.91) (2.07) (0.33)
I-L 0.105 0.826 0.185 0.607
(0.81) (4.40) (1.83) (3.78)
BR as a proxy for financial constraints CR as a proxy for financial constraints
Liquid 0.177 -0.361 -0.538 0.209 -0.255 -0.464
(1.33) (-2.49) (-3.49) (1.30) (-1.93) (-2.53)
Illiquid 0.399 0.461 0.062 0.238 0.436 0.199
(2.84) (2.57) (0.36) (1.26) (2.64) (0.86)
I-L 0.222 0.822 0.028 0.691
(1.41) (4.31) (0.13) (4.11)
WW as a proxy for financial constraints HP as a proxy for financial constraints
Liquid -0.088 -0.166 -0.078 0.016 -0.410 -0.426
(-0.87) (-1.16) (-0.54) (0.17) (-2.52) (-2.97)
Illiquid 0.106 0.526 0.420 0.236 0.457 0.221
(1.14) (2.89) (2.50) (2.35) (2.39) (1.33)
I-L 0.193 0.691 0.220 0.867
(1.58) (3.61) (1.76) (4.32)
41
Table 6: Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the financially constrained and uncon-
strained groups
For each month, we estimate Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regression of monthly excess returns on the lagged
principal component of liquidity (PCLIQ) and the control variables of the market value of equity (MV ), book-to-
market ratio (B/M), and momentum (MOM) for the financially constrained and unconstrained subsamples. PCLIQ
is the first principal component of three individual liquidity measures of the quoted bid-ask spread, price impact, and
negative turnover ratio, MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t, B/M is the ratio of the book
value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t − 1, divided by the market value of equity at the end of June in
year t − 1 from the CRSP, and MOM is the cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous six months. We
use asset size (AT ), payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices
as the proxies for financial constraints. At the end of June of each year t, we sort stocks into terciles on their AT , PR,
WW , and HP , or sort stocks into two groups based on their BR and CR for the fiscal year ending in the calendar
year t − 1 and produce the financially constrained and unconstrained subsamples. “Unconstrained” represents the
financially unconstrained subsample that contains firms in the top tercile of AT or PR, firms in the bottom tercile
of WW or HP , or firms that have BR or CR. “Constrained” represents the financially constrained subsample that
contains firms in the bottom tercile of AT or PR, firms in the top tercile of WW or HP , or firms that have no BR
and CR. We winsorize each regressor at the top and bottom 1% and transform them to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors are in
parentheses. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the rest.
Constant PCLIQ MV B/M MOM Constant PCLIQ MV B/M MOM
AT as a proxy for financial constraints PR as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.443 0.083 0.752 0.147
(0.90) (0.87) (2.35) (1.85)
-0.022 0.033 -0.476 0.064 0.057 0.141 0.081 -0.276 0.064 0.127
(-0.04) (0.36) (-1.63) (0.95) (1.04) (0.32) (1.02) (-0.68) (1.01) (2.14)
Constrained 0.532 0.638 0.537 0.436
(1.34) (5.58) (1.44) (4.30)
-0.198 0.533 0.090 0.405 0.039 0.045 0.377 -0.052 0.256 0.069
(-0.39) (4.74) (1.10) (4.41) (0.52) (0.10) (3.81) (-0.41) (3.88) (1.15)
BR as a proxy for financial constraints CR as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 1.119 0.073 1.769 -0.104
(2.37) (0.69) (3.00) (-1.08)
0.359 0.072 0.008 0.111 0.120 0.308 -0.035 -0.315 0.038 0.173
(0.66) (0.73) (0.06) (1.30) (1.64) (0.45) (-0.35) (-1.63) (0.50) (2.29)
Constrained 0.335 0.486 0.499 0.401
(0.79) (4.69) (1.17) (4.10)
-0.077 0.406 0.042 0.245 0.069 0.103 0.340 0.057 0.233 0.073
(-0.14) (4.07) (0.69) (3.17) (1.00) (0.20) (3.58) (1.03) (3.18) (1.11)
WW as a proxy for financial constraints HP as a proxy for financial constraints
Unconstrained 0.694 -0.053 0.776 0.049
(1.57) (-0.68) (1.84) (0.59)
0.246 -0.084 -0.443 0.070 0.045 0.152 -0.015 -0.571 0.112 0.067
(0.48) (-1.09) (-1.46) (1.26) (0.87) (0.34) (-0.19) (-1.84) (1.85) (1.40)
Constrained 0.680 0.595 0.474 0.605
(1.74) (5.32) (1.14) (5.22)
0.129 0.537 0.480 0.333 0.011 -0.268 0.541 0.123 0.357 0.068
(0.26) (4.83) (2.36) (3.75) (0.15) (-0.50) (4.83) (1.47) (3.80) (0.90)
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Table 7: Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions with the interaction term
For each month, we estimate Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns on the proxies of
financial constraints (FC), principal component of liquidity (PCLIQ), the interaction term (FC × PCLIQ), and the
control variables of market value of equity (MV ), book-to-market (B/M), and momentum (MOM). We use asset size
(AT ), payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices as the proxies
for financial constraints. FC is the actual value of AT , PR, WW , or HP , one for firms with BR or CR, or zero for
firms without BR or CR, PCLIQ is the first principal component of three individual liquidity measures of the quoted
bid-ask spread, price impact, and negative turnover ratio, MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year
t, B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t − 1, divided by the market value
of equity at the end of June in year t− 1 from the CRSP, and MOM is the cumulative compounded stock returns of
the previous six months. We winsorize each regressor at the top and bottom 1% and transform them to have a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one. The corresponding t-statistics based on Newey and West’s (1987) standard
errors are in parentheses. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the rest.
Constant FC PCLIQ FC × PCLIQ MV B/M MOM
AT as a proxy for financial constraints
0.311 -0.102 0.040 0.337 0.059
(0.82) (-1.83) (0.78) (5.91) (1.04)
-0.007 0.303 -0.150 0.200 0.076
(-0.02) (3.42) (-0.94) (3.66) (1.39)
-0.534 -0.560 0.336 -0.237 -0.195 0.202 0.078
(-0.50) (-0.67) (1.78) (-0.93) (-1.07) (3.68) (1.45)
PR as a proxy for financial constraints
0.396 -0.005 -0.047 0.332 0.070
(0.87) (-0.12) (-1.24) (6.07) (1.26)
-0.007 0.303 -0.150 0.200 0.076
(-0.02) (3.42) (-0.94) (3.66) (1.39)
-0.910 0.156 0.565 -0.301 -0.139 0.212 0.090
(-0.99) (1.97) (3.53) (-2.09) (-0.93) (3.96) (1.69)
BR as a proxy for financial constraints
0.287 0.096 -0.043 0.271 0.048
(0.60) (1.28) (-1.08) (4.07) (0.68)
-0.007 0.303 -0.150 0.200 0.076
(-0.02) (3.42) (-0.94) (3.66) (1.39)
-0.772 0.357 0.513 -0.231 0.056 0.202 0.083
(-1.48) (4.18) (3.75) (-2.08) (0.73) (3.06) (1.31)
CR as a proxy for financial constraints
0.348 0.050 -0.035 0.298 0.033
(0.63) (0.72) (-1.14) (4.39) (0.47)
-0.007 0.303 -0.150 0.200 0.076
(-0.02) (3.42) (-0.94) (3.66) (1.39)
-1.133 0.312 1.180 -0.845 0.037 0.217 0.069
(-1.61) (2.52) (3.18) (-2.50) (0.45) (3.28) (1.08)
WW as a proxy for financial constraints
-1.193 0.218 0.021 0.306 0.062
(-1.93) (2.20) (0.74) (5.53) (1.19)
-0.007 0.303 -0.150 0.200 0.076
(-0.02) (3.42) (-0.94) (3.66) (1.39)
3.617 -0.196 -1.532 1.867 -0.237 0.212 0.080
(1.66) (-1.34) (-2.97) (3.52) (-1.64) (3.86) (1.68)
HP as a proxy for financial constraints
0.407 -0.000 -0.047 0.308 0.046
(1.17) (-0.00) (-1.52) (5.34) (0.87)
-0.007 0.303 -0.150 0.200 0.076
(-0.02) (3.42) (-0.94) (3.66) (1.39)
0.494 -0.369 0.159 0.352 -0.329 0.169 0.069
(1.06) (-2.35) (1.08) (2.15) (-2.26) (3.10) (1.42)
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Table 8: Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions with the interaction term in the good and bad time subsamples
At the end of each month, we split the full sample into the two subsamples of good and bad times. We define a good time as a period that has a negative
change in a spread between a ten-year Baa corporate bond rate and a one-year Treasury bill rate, and define a bad time as a period that has a positive
change in the spread. For each month, we estimate Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns on the proxies of financial
constraints (FC), the principal component of liquidity (PCLIQ), the interaction term (FC ×PCLIQ), and the control variables of the market value of
equity (MV ), book-to-market ratio (B/M), and momentum (MOM). We use asset size (AT ), payout ratio (PR), bond rating (BR), commercial paper
rating (CR), the WW, and HP indices as the proxies for financial constraints. FC is the actual value of AT , PR, WW , or HP , one for firms with BR
or CR, or zero for firms without BR or CR, PCLIQ is the first principal component of three individual liquidity measures, MV is the market value of
equity at the end of June of year t, B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in year t− 1, divided by the market value of
equity at the end of June in year t− 1 from the CRSP, and MOM is the cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous six months. We winsorize
each regressor at the top and bottom 1% and transform them to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The corresponding t-statistics
based on Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period covers 1985 to 2017 for BR and CR and 1975 to 2017 for the
rest.
Bad time Good time
Constant FC PCLIQ FC × PCLIQ MV B/M MOM Constant FC PCLIQ FC × PCLIQ MV B/M MOM
AT as a proxy for financial constraints
0.349 0.080 -0.027 0.262 0.022 0.331 -0.232 0.083 0.390 0.068
(0.52) (0.99) (-0.30) (2.84) (0.23) (0.76) (-2.81) (1.44) (5.35) (1.01)
0.022 0.255 0.438 0.231 0.090 0.013 0.343 -0.571 0.177 0.049
(0.03) (1.72) (2.04) (2.56) (0.99) (0.03) (3.18) (-2.55) (2.49) (0.73)
0.587 -0.334 0.055 -0.492 0.391 0.242 0.092 -1.352 -0.747 0.554 -0.033 -0.618 0.173 0.051
(0.43) (-0.35) (0.22) (-1.48) (1.46) (2.72) (1.04) (-0.87) (-0.60) (2.12) (-0.09) (-2.56) (2.42) (0.77)
PR as a proxy for financial constraints
0.283 0.051 0.019 0.244 0.030 0.522 -0.048 -0.098 0.397 0.082
(0.37) (0.88) (0.31) (2.72) (0.32) (0.97) (-0.91) (-1.97) (5.80) (1.29)
0.022 0.255 0.438 0.231 0.090 0.013 0.343 -0.571 0.177 0.049
(0.03) (1.72) (2.04) (2.56) (0.99) (0.03) (3.18) (-2.55) (2.49) (0.73)
-1.633 0.278 0.682 -0.476 0.426 0.222 0.090 -0.363 0.064 0.476 -0.168 -0.542 0.207 0.075
(-1.06) (2.30) (2.57) (-2.03) (2.08) (2.49) (1.01) (-0.32) (0.58) (2.33) (-0.91) (-2.59) (3.01) (1.17)
BR as a proxy for financial constraints
-0.225 0.226 -0.011 0.239 0.028 0.744 -0.014 -0.067 0.298 0.040
(-0.30) (2.19) (-0.16) (2.18) (0.23) (1.19) (-0.12) (-1.45) (3.48) (0.48)
0.022 0.255 0.438 0.231 0.090 0.013 0.343 -0.571 0.177 0.049
(0.03) (1.72) (2.04) (2.56) (0.99) (0.03) (3.18) (-2.55) (2.49) (0.73)
-1.459 0.556 0.748 -0.474 0.224 0.199 0.102 -0.221 0.204 0.355 -0.057 -0.066 0.205 0.046
(-1.77) (3.90) (3.29) (-2.41) (1.78) (1.78) (0.96) (-0.31) (1.59) (2.05) (-0.40) (-0.71) (2.44) (0.61)
CR as a proxy for financial constraints
-0.330 0.204 -0.035 0.277 0.025 0.915 -0.066 -0.040 0.315 0.016
(-0.37) (2.09) (-0.61) (2.39) (0.21) (1.24) (-0.61) (-1.16) (3.67) (0.19)
0.022 0.255 0.438 0.231 0.090 0.013 0.343 -0.571 0.177 0.049
(0.03) (1.72) (2.04) (2.56) (0.99) (0.03) (3.18) (-2.55) (2.49) (0.73)
-1.479 0.362 1.203 -0.865 0.127 0.221 0.094 -0.866 0.281 1.206 -0.855 -0.033 0.211 0.029
(-1.47) (2.03) (2.18) (-1.66) (1.11) (1.91) (0.89) (-0.84) (1.49) (2.27) (-1.80) (-0.29) (2.53) (0.37)
WW as a proxy for financial constraints
0.408 -0.023 0.034 0.216 0.031 -2.429 0.406 0.015 0.372 0.069
(0.45) (-0.19) (0.67) (2.36) (0.34) (-2.86) (2.67) (0.43) (5.45) (1.15)
0.022 0.255 0.438 0.231 0.090 0.013 0.343 -0.571 0.177 0.049
(0.03) (1.72) (2.04) (2.56) (0.99) (0.03) (3.18) (-2.55) (2.49) (0.73)
8.693 -0.686 -2.335 2.766 -0.011 0.204 0.105 0.001 0.164 -1.005 1.272 -0.395 0.219 0.049
(2.43) (-2.98) (-2.66) (3.08) (-0.05) (2.20) (1.34) (0.00) (0.88) (-1.58) (1.97) (-1.95) (3.16) (0.82)
HP as a proxy for financial constraints
0.736 -0.257 -0.050 0.245 0.010 0.198 0.198 -0.044 0.354 0.055
(1.11) (-1.90) (-0.88) (2.61) (0.11) (0.54) (1.38) (-1.26) (4.80) (0.89)
0.022 0.255 0.438 0.231 0.090 0.013 0.343 -0.571 0.177 0.049
(0.03) (1.72) (2.04) (2.56) (0.99) (0.03) (3.18) (-2.55) (2.49) (0.73)
1.285 -0.929 -0.181 0.871 -0.030 0.207 0.096 -0.053 0.045 0.401 -0.019 -0.543 0.143 0.035
(1.60) (-4.06) (-0.79) (3.40) (-0.15) (2.26) (1.20) (-0.10) (0.22) (2.06) (-0.09) (-2.61) (2.03) (0.56)
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